The people who cut the electricity had also prepared for the phone calls.
On December 23, 2015, a cyberattack hit three Ukrainian power-distribution companies, leaving approximately 225,000 customers without electricity. At one utility, the attackers flooded the call centre with thousands of calls, blocking customers trying to report the outage. The failure outside and the confusion on the phone were parts of the same operation. SANS and E-ISAC investigation
Those were utility reporting lines. The evidence does not establish that every emergency number stopped working. What it describes is disturbing enough: someone had considered what people would do after the lights went out and attacked that route too.
For a customer, a power cut is usually a problem the electricity company is trying to fix. This time, the company itself was under attack.
Someone else was operating the breakers
The US government's February 2016 account described outsiders remotely operating circuit breakers through the utilities' computer systems. Company personnel reported attacks occurring within 30 minutes of one another. The intruders were using remote-access tools or industrial-control software, with legitimate credentials believed to have been acquired beforehand. ICS-CERT's original incident alert
The equipment that let staff control electricity distribution from a distance had become a way for outsiders to interrupt it. There was no need to stand beside each breaker or physically enter every affected substation.
That changes the meaning of a control room. Its screens can show the people responsible for the power supply that something is wrong while the same system gives an intruder the means to make it worse.
The US team disclosed a limit to its findings: its account rested on interviews with personnel at six organizations and corroborating reports and documents. It had not independently examined the attack's technical evidence. The alert was an assessment of the incident, not an unrestricted forensic record.
The way in could arrive with the morning email
In January 2016, ESET researchers reported finding BlackEnergy malware at several Ukrainian electricity companies. Their investigation described malicious Microsoft Office documents delivered by targeted emails. A recipient could be persuaded to enable a document's macro, allowing the infection to proceed. ESET also found the destructive KillDisk component on affected systems. ESET's technical findings
An attachment is an unremarkable thing to receive at work. That is what makes it useful to an attacker. The danger can enter through a routine task, long before anyone has reason to associate it with a failure in the physical world.
Finding malware does not, by itself, explain who opened a breaker. The SANS/E-ISAC analysis distinguished the tools that enabled intrusion or delayed recovery from the attackers' direct use of control systems to interrupt electricity. How the outage was caused
Restoring power was part of the target
The attackers had reached beyond the controls used to cause the outage.
A later Idaho National Laboratory analysis described damaged communications converters and computers made unusable with KillDisk. It also described interference with telephone communications that degraded the responders' ability to coordinate. These were systems needed while the utilities were trying to recover. Idaho National Laboratory's case study
Think about the difference that makes during a failure. A recovery plan assumes that staff can reach equipment, communicate and use the tools available to them. An adversary who has studied that plan can try to take those tools away at the moment they are needed.
The Ukrainian operators did restore power. INL's account describes engineers going to substations and controlling them manually, bringing electricity back within six hours. It also records that substations were still being operated manually more than two months later, with remote breaker control unavailable.
The lights coming back on did not mean the utilities had recovered all their capabilities.
Who was behind it?
In October 2020, the US Justice Department announced charges against six officers of Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU. Prosecutors linked the alleged conspiracy to destructive attacks against Ukraine's electricity grid and other targets. Researchers had tracked the activity under names including Sandworm. Justice Department announcement
An indictment contains allegations, not a verdict. The announcement identifies military-intelligence officers and cybercrime charges; it does not establish a terrorist designation for the defendants.
That distinction does not soften what happened to the customers. Their electricity supply had become something a remote adversary could interrupt.
The part that should still trouble us
Writing for Dragos a decade later, former National Grid protection and control manager Phil Tonkin described the incident as an attack on restoration as well as supply. He also noted improvements in industrial-network visibility and threat sharing since 2015. Defenders have learned from the case. Tonkin's retrospective
This incident does not prove that any particular grid could be shut down today, or that a nationwide blackout is inevitable. Its lesson is more specific: a determined intruder can study both a service and the people who will try to restore it.
In Ukraine, the operators had a way to work around the compromised systems. Engineers could still reach the substations and operate them by hand.
The question for the next target is how much of its recovery plan would still work after someone had spent months learning how to interfere with it.
Continue the investigation
Read our companion investigation, They Got Inside America's Infrastructure. What Were They Waiting For?, about the documented Volt Typhoon intrusions and the risks US agencies identified.
For more investigations in audio, browse Unexplained History. This is a general series recommendation, not a podcast version of this case.







